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Abstract— The rapid progression of sophisticated advance 
metering infrastructure (AMI), allows us to have a better 
understanding and data from demand-response (DR) solutions. 
There are vast amounts of research on the internet of things and 
its application on the smart grids has been examined to find the 
most optimized bill for the user; however, we propose a novel 
approach of house loads, combined with owning a battery electric 
vehicle (BEV) equipped with the BEV communication controllers 
and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology. In this paper we use the 
Stackelberg game approach to achieve an efficient and effective 
optimized algorithm for the users (followers) based on time 
dependent pricing. We also assumed an electricity retailer 
company (leader) and a two-way bilateral communication 
procedure. The usage-based side of the game has been studied 
together with demand side management (DSM). Real-time 
pricing (RTP) from time-of-use (TOU) companies has been used 
for better results, and Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) handles the 
uncertain behavior of BEV drivers. Numerical results compared 
to those from the simulation show that with this method we can 
reshape the customer’s demand for the best efficiency.  
Keywords—internet of things; real-time pricing; demand 
response; game theory; battery electric vehicle; vehicle-to-grid 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In a traditional power grid, proper metering may 
decrease demand response (DR) non-scheduled loads slightly. 
In a smart grid, several advanced techniques can be integrated, 
including advanced metering infrastructure, energy 
management systems, distributed energy systems, intelligent 
electronic devices, internet of things (IoTs), and battery 
electric vehicles (BEVs) [1]. Smart grids are proposed as 
innovative power-grid systems that unite a smart metering 
infrastructure capable of sensing and measuring the power 
consumption of users [2] along with DR programs that 
promise solutions for improving the efficiency of future power 
grids [3]. Two shapes of DR have been discussed previously. 
First, the retailer has all the power to directly control the 
consumer’s usage which significantly decreases the 
satisfaction function of the user. Second, the retailer reshapes 
the DR through dynamic pricing, such as critical pricing and 
real time pricing (RTP) [4]. The latter is our goal in this study. 
Due to bi-directional energy flows, price-responsive loads, 
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), phasor measurement 
units (PMUs) etc., a quick growth of sophisticated smart 
metering facilities and advanced two-ways communication 
technologies has made managing the energy in smart grids 
more flexible and more stimulating [5-7]. A self-scheduling 
model was studied in [8] for consumers who join in day-ahead 
energy markets and seek to maximize their profits. Price 
uncertainty was studied for generation company as a leader in 
game theory framework [9]. It considers both demand-side 
reverse bids provided by an aggregator, and random outage of 
generating units for transmission lines [10]. Game-theoretic 
methods and the Stackelberg approach are widely being used 
to study DR and load peak shaving. For example, the authors 
in [11-12] proposed a Stackelberg game approach to deal with 
DR scheduling under load uncertainty based on real-time 
pricing in a residential grid. Likewise, [13-14] used a 
Stackelberg game approach between one power company and 
multiple users, challenging them to maximize their benefit 
with the goal of flattening the aggregated load curve. Authors 
in [15] attacked this problem using a bi-level hybrid multi-
objective evolutionary algorithm with the purpose of 
optimizing the profit for the utility company. The game 
theoretic approach has been developed and designed for 
experiments (DOE), to find the clearing price in a retail 
electricity market with a high penetration of small and mid-
size renewable suppliers [16]. However, our approach is using 
the mixed integer nonlinear programming to propose an 
accurate two-side profit achievement for the user and retailer. 
Having the time-of-use (TOU) pricing scheme, retailers are 
practically trying to charge a calculable fee for the fixed price 
that depends on the amount of the user’s consumption during a 
time interval [17]. In this paper, we recommend a novel 
approach of flattening the peak loads by considering 
schedulable home appliances and BEVs, which can be charged 
and discharged to the grid by using grid-to-vehicle (G2V) and 
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologies. Recently, a research has 
been conducted on using Stackelberg game theory to 
coordinate electric vehicle charging schemes [18]. However, 
V2G technology, which makes the operator able to receive 
power from the BEVs, has not been practically taken into 
account. At last, by using an advanced two-way 
communication link and BEVs charging/discharging schedule, 
it not only guarantees the maximum profit for the utility 
company by peak-shaving, it also satisfies the user by 
elevating their utility function, which means minimizing the 
cost and maximizing the satisfaction. Main contributions of 
this paper include following key points: 
 Using a price-based model to develop an efficient 
algorithm between retailers and users (with BEVs), 
and aiming for balanced supply-load by shaving 
peaks; 
 Generating optimized results for both retailers and 
users with an iterative algorithm, and finding 
Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) to achieve optimal loads 
for both parties; 
 Formulating 1-N leader-follower Stackelberg 
relationship between one retailer and N users; and 
adopting the RTP function of the retailer and the 
utility function of N users; and 
 Handling uncertainty of different driving habits of 
BEV owners by Monte Carlo simulations (MCS). 
 
Specifically, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II discusses the system model and formulates the 
Stackelberg game theory. In Section III, we use data to 
generate load profiles of BEVs. Some key aspects of 
Stackelberg game theory and the logic are presented in Section 
IV.  Results are provided in Section IV, and conclusions are 
drawn in Section V. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
In Fig. 1, a model is established for one utility company 
and N  users with BEVs. These users will adjust their 
electricity usages by using advanced metering infrastructure 
and heterogeneous communication technologies, with the 
ultimate goals to reduce overall costs.  The utility company 
(retailer) can provide hourly price structures to these users to 
encourage peak shaving and ultimately to maximize profits.  
Advanced communication technologies enable the cloud 
computing environment and real time sensing/controlling 
including IoTs [19]. In this environment, an entity represents 
an electric load (consumer) or a prosumer such as a BEV. In 
the cloud environment, the real-time access to each entity is 
guaranteed. The system operator can categorize users into 
different groups. As shown in Fig.1, all prosumers can be 
placed in one group, and other conventional loads in other. By 
utilizing instantaneous two-way communication links, real-
time electricity prices will be broadcasted, conventional users’ 
consumption behaviors will be adjusted, and BEVs 
charging/discharging schedules can be changed. To maintain 
system stabilities and guarantee maximum profits, the retailer 
can impose load curtailment during peak hours. 
 
A. Retailer Company Model 
In this model, the cost function for the retailer is labelled 
as  C gt t , and depends on the amount of electricity  
 
Fig. 1. System model of the retailer company and users 
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Where , andt t ta b c are the generating coefficients. During 
different time intervals, each coefficient has a different value.  
Taking a differential operation against (1), one obtains the 
marginal cost function tC  : 
( )t t t t tC g a g b    (2) 
which is the cost to produce one more unit of electricity. Such 
marginal cost must be lower than the actual cost in order to 
guarantee profits for the retailer company. So, market price 
equation can be defined: 
    ( )t t t tt tt t gg g aP bCt       ,   1t    (3) 
where tP  is price at each time slot and t is a time-wise profit 
coefficient. In reference [15], a similar profit coefficient was 
introduced, minimized and validated. In this paper, there are 
24 time intervals (slots), corresponding to 24 prices in a day. 
The retailer provides electricity and its price to the consumers 
who will decide how much to use in each time interval.  Thus, 
a user can move his/her electricity usages to off-peak intervals 
to minimize the total costs. The retailer wants the most profit 
and the least aggregated peak load in order to avoid expensive 
backup generators. Flattening the demand load should be two-
ways as a user has critical needs for electricity.  To determine 
the optimal generation vector, one should minimize variations 
in generation, and match supply with demand. Therefore, the 
retailer problem can be formulated as follows: 
 
2
min ( ) tRC t
t T
U g g g

    (4) 
  maxs.t. min ,t t t tL g g L     (5) 
                                
,
1
N
t n t
n
L l

   (6) 
                                        
1
, ,
1
N
t i t n t
i
L l l i n


     (7) 
Where RCU is the utility function of the retailer company and 
g  is an average power generation during a day. Lt  is the 
summation of electricity demands of all N users during the 
time interval t. tg

 is the maximum capacity of the retailer 
company’s generation at the interval t, maxtL  is the overall 
upper bound of the total power demands for slot  t. ,n tl  is the 
power consumed by user n in the interval t One must notice 
that the above-mentioned function is different from profit 
maximization. In (4), minimizing utility function may lead to 
maximized profits. In (5), the generation should always meet 
the total demand of all users, and be lower than the smallest 
threshold for generation capacity and upper load ranges. In (6) 
and (7), tL  can be obtained by asynchronous user’s adjustment 
of consumption, reflecting the human nature that no two users 
will react to real-time pricing schemes due to different needs.  
In (7), a user adjusts his/her usage, while others don’t. In such 
non-simultaneous framework, no two users will negate their 
effects by increasing and decreasing their demands at the same 
time. 
B. User Model 
Each user has its own utility function, shown in (8). 
According to what has been explained in Section II, with the 
application of IoTs, the user can be an entity representing an 
electric load (consumer) as the first term, or a prosumer such 
as a BEV as the second term. Function , ,( )n t n tx  models the 
satisfaction of the electricity consumers; in which ,n tx is the 
general power consumption variable, ,n tl  being the residential 
demand and ,n ts  being BEV demand. The third term is the 
total amount of money to be paid by the consumers, which 
leads to less satisfaction as represented by a negative sign. 
With this, the demand side problem is formulated as follows: 
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where ,n t  is the preference parameter with indices n (user) 
and t (time), n is a predetermined constant integer, nL is the 
total daily energy usage, , { 1, 0,1}n ts    is a discrete variable 
which is multiplied by rated battery power 
BEV
P  of electric 
vehicles and indicates BEV charging {1}, discharging {-1} 
status. If it is charging, it will have a positive effect on 
satisfaction of the utility function, and if it is discharging, it 
has a negative effect. Although discharging has a negative 
effect on satisfaction, it is losing the power obtained in the 
past charging periods. However, by selling discharged 
electricity, it has positive effect on the third term of utility 
function. 
req
nT is the required time to fully charge the BEV, 
max
nT is the maximum number of hours that the battery is 
interacting actively with the network, , 
,
dep
n T
SOC shows the 
BEV state of charge, and 
nBC  is the battery capacity, 
dep
T is 
the vehicle’s departure time from the house. (9) Denotes the 
satisfaction function , ,( )n t n tx of the user n by consuming 
,n tl amount of electricity. (10) provides the upper and lower 
boundaries for electricity demand of nth user n for interval t. 
(11) expresses the temporally-coupled constraint which 
wouldn’t reduce the total daily consumption of the user n, so 
we can apply load shedding only in terms of pick shaving and 
load shifting. (12) states the cumulative charging time in order 
to fully charge the BEV before leaving one’s residence. (13) 
limits the maximum number of hours for a BEV connected to 
the grid system, either in G2V or V2G mode. Therefore, by 
limiting the hours that the battery is being charged or 
discharged, we reduce the detrimental effect of constant 
battery usage. In (14) the sequence of charging/discharging 
should be in a way that by the time that the BEV owner 
decides to leaves the house, the SOC should be 100%. 
   In the Stackelberg equilibrium context and the hierarchical 
process, our aim is to maximize the leader’s (retailer) utility 
function by having the data of the follower’s (user) rational 
reaction set (RRS).  The existence of the Stackelberg 
equilibrium has been discussed and shown in [4]. In addition, 
the model in (8) is formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear 
programming problem, and can be solved via MATLAB-
GAMS interface. 
III. BEV LOAD PROFILE 
To model BEV load profiles, data from National 
Household Travel Survey (NHTS) for rural New York State 
were utilized to estimate average driving mileages and 
optimize battery usages. The SOC of the vehicles upon their 
home arrival time is of crucial importance [20]. Table I shows 
the data according to different types of cars and different 
characteristics. Also, in Figs. 2-4, probability distribution 
functions (PDFs) for driving behavior, including arrival time, 
departure time, and traveled distance in rural areas in New 
York state has been drawn from NHTS data. The reason why 
we chose rural areas in New York State is that Alfred 
University is located in rural areas. 
Moreover, configuring the time of fully charged BEV 
depends on the distance it travels daily, and we assume that 
BEV is a constant power prosumer. From Fig. 5, we obtain the 
required charging time based on daily driven distance [21-22]. 
IV. STACKELBERG GAME THEORY ALGORITHM 
In Fig. 6, iterative DR algorithm is illustrated via a flow 
chart. At the beginning of the computation, the retailer 
broadcasts hourly price one hour ahead. According to (3), 
marginal cost function is calculated by power generation  
  
Fig. 2. Arrival time pdf for BEV owners in rural areas in New York State 
 
Fig. 3. Departure time pdf for BEV owners in rural areas in New York State 
 
Fig. 4. Average travelled distance pdf for BEV owners in rural areas in New 
York State 
TABLE.I    Different Characteristics of BEVs 
Vehicle 
Type 
Commercial 
model 
Expected 
Market 
Share 
[%] 
Energy 
[kW-
hr] 
Rated 
Battery 
Power 
[kW] 
Single 
Charge 
Drive-
Range [mile] 
Compact 
sedan 
i3, BMW 51.48 33 7 114 
Mid-size 
sedan 
Model S, 
Tesla 
10.35 75 11.5 259 
Mid-size 
SUV 
Model X, 
Tesla 
38.17 100 17.2 295 
 
requirement and initial price broadcasted. As the relationship 
between the price equation and power is linear, the algorithm 
uses the generation value.  Final prices can be found once the 
total power generation value is known.  Afterwards, Monte 
Carlo simulation emulates driving behaviors of BEV owners.  
Users respond to the prices broadcasted, and shift their 
usages to non-peak time slots. BEV discharging features can 
help the retailer company to offset some loads during peak 
 
hours. The peak-shaving and the demand aggregation can 
be accomplished continuously instead. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Required time to fully charge a BEV with respect to distance driven 
and car size 
 
Fig. 6. Stackelberg game theory algorithm 
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
 Residential consumers are divided into three groups as 
tabulated in Table II.  Group 1 corresponds to utility function 
coefficient ,n t of 5.0, with 50 BEVs.  Groups 2 and 3 do not 
have BEVs, but have different utility coefficients.  The 
minimum and the maximum values refer to the lower and 
upper bounds of the targeted power demands.  For example, 
Group 1 consumption varies between 70% and 150% of its 
nominal load. The price coefficient is kept constant, i.e., 
1.2t  . In Fig. 7, load profiles are shown for Group 2 and 3; 
and benefits from the game theory applications can be 
visualized by examining a profile with or without the 
algorithm. In general, the load profiles are flattened due to 
users’ participations.  In comparison with Group 2, Group 3 
shows less eagerness to participate as it has larger ,n t . For 
group 1, as illustrated in Table I, managing the vehicle’s 
V2G or G2V status is of great importance. If a large number 
of BEV owners begin to charge their vehicles immediately 
returning home, the sudden power load may be undesirable.  
By applying the algorithm in Fig. 6, the uncertainty related to 
random behaviors of BEV owners can be managed by 
optimizing charging and discharging activities. In Fig. 8, 
wide bands of load profile for BEVs are shown for each time 
slot in a day. Without game theory applications, the users’ 
peak load can coincide with that of the BEV charging peaks.   
In Fig. 9, modified BEV load profile is obtained after 
applying the algorithm.  The negative values represent the 
V2G feature of the BEVs, or discharging. After coming back 
to home (between 17:00 or so and midnight), most vehicles 
are either sending back power to the grid or in standing by 
mode. The charging period mainly happens between 1:00 and 
6:00. Comparing the time interval between 14:00 to 16:00 in 
Fig. 7 and Fig. 10, more peak shaving has been achieved for  
Group 1 due to the presence of V2G technology. Fig. 11 
shows the total generation over 24 hours for users’ 
aggregated demand with and without implementing the DR 
program. The expected value at each hour is used to obtain  
TABLE.II   Satisfaction function and generation coefficients 
 
Group 
Utility function 
coeff. 
Generation Coeff. Min 
Demand 
% 
Max 
Demand% 
,n t
  
n   at   bt
  
1 5.0 0.1 0.01  
(00:00-8:00) 
0.02  
(8:00-24:00) 
0.2 
70 150 
2 5.5 0.1 75 140 
3 6.0 0.1 80 120 
 
 
Fig. 7. Load Profiles for Groups 2 and 3 of Consumers Before and After 
Applying Optimization Algorithm 
 
 
Fig. 8. Uncertain Load Profile of 50 BEVs Before Applying the Algorithm 
without V2G technology 
 
 
Fig. 9. Uncertain Load Profile of 50 BEVs After Applying the Algorithm with 
V2G technology 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Load Profiles for Group 1 of Consumers Before and After 
Implementing the DR program 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Aggregated Generation Profiles Before and After Applying 
Optimization the Algorithm 
 
Fig. 12. Conventional and Real-Time Prices Broadcasted by Retailer 
 
Table III. Numerical performance evaluation 
 
Scenario 
Peak 
demand 
[kw] 
Total 
Energy 
Usage 
[kwh] 
Total 
Payments 
[$] 
Generation 
Cost [$] 
Without 
RTP 
and 
Without 
V2G 
3841 59092 36135 15115 
RTP 
and 
V2G 
2755 59092 30244 12661 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the profiles in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11.From Table IV, the standard 
deviation shows that more fluctuations will happen mainly  
from 22:00 to 24:00 and 1:00 to 5:00. Therefore, the power 
system operator should consider more spinning reserve after  
midnight; this will cause an increase in power system 
operation cost. Finally, the real-time prices over 24 hours that  
has been derived from the algorithm is compared with the 
conventional price in Fig. 12. The performance of the 
algorithm is evaluated by two scenarios (with and without 
RTP and V2G) from various aspects. The numerical results 
are shown in Table III. The peak demand is significantly 
decreased by almost 1 MW. Total energy usage has not been 
changed, which proves that the retailer cannot reduce the 
whole amount of energy that a user expects to consume per 
day. This reality is shown in (11). Using algorithm in Fig. 6, 
the total user payments decreased about 16%, which 
demonstrates the efficiency of game theory application. 
Additionally, the generation costs of both scenarios can be less 
than the total payments, i.e., making profits for the retailer. 
CONCLUSION 
    Using game theory algorithm, one can reduce costs to 
consumers and potentially reshape generating profiles. In this 
paper, a model included one retailer and N users (with some of 
them owning BEVs).  In particular, an optimized approach can 
shave peaks with DR managements. The game theory and 
Stackelberg equilibrium have been utilized to illustrate an 
algorithm for three different user groups. By comparing the 
results with and without DR managements, the efficiency of 
the algorithm can be shown.  Using MCS in MATLAB-
GAMS, the stochastic behavior of BEVs are simulated. 
According to the statistical analysis, such algorithm based on 
the game theory can reduce the peak loads. To extend this 
study, having multiple retailer companies can be taken into 
consideration. 
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Table IV. Statistical results for generation values in [kw] considering BEV uncertainty and RTP 
Time [hour] 1 2 3 4 5 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
tg Expected value 2412 2060 2255 2256 2659 2694 2732 2571 2573 2556 2524 2561 2283 1976 2163 
tg Standard deviation 66 76 26 28 42 29 49 12 14 14 8 16 130 66 197 
